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Abstract
In this paper we demonstrate that the efficiency of quantum spatial search can be sig-
nificantly altered by malicious manipulation of the input data in the client-server model.
We achieve this by exploiting exceptional configuration effect on Szegedy spatial search and
proposing a framework suitable for analysing efficiency of attacks on quantum search algo-
rithms. We provide the analysis of proposed attacks for different models of random graphs.
The obtained results demonstrate that quantum algorithms in general are not secure against
input data alteration.
1 Introduction
Motivation While the intensive research effort invested in the area of quantum computing
is fully justified by groundbreaking theoretical developments [1, 2, 3], year by year scientists
have discovered new limitations of quantum computing devices [4]. Quantum algorithms have
been proved to be susceptible to noise, which may falsify the results of the computation. This
fact motivated the development of the theory of quantum error-correcting codes. Unitary oper-
ation decomposition provides numerous problems including applications to hardware with fixed
topology [5]. These aspects started to play critical role after first commercial quantum com-
puting systems became available. Furthermore, hardware attacks, based on the security holes
of conventional electronics, have been discovered for quantum cryptographic protocols [6]. The
issues mentioned above demonstrated that the theoretical security confirmed by the laws of
physics in the ideal environment could be deceptive in the real-world applications. For the users
it is important to be aware that quantum algorithms are inefficient for some types of input
data. One of such examples is quantum spatial search, which is inefficient on 2D grid [1]. This
demonstrates that the quantum algorithms are not only unsuitable for some types of problems,
but, even for generally optimal quantum algorithms [7], it is possible to construct input data
rendering them slow.
These examples show that, while quantum algorithms may be a milestone in computational
theory, their practical implementation and security still need to be carefully checked. From
the computational complexity point of view, it remains unknown whether the existing quantum
algorithms can provide the speed-up promised by the theoretical results, especially when applied
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to large datasets. On the other hand, the ability to describe the types of data which render
quantum algorithms ineffective can be used to develop post-quantum protocols.
Furthermore, as the remote utilization of quantum computational resources plays vital role
for the development of quantum technologies, one should consider various aspects of the func-
tioning of quantum devices accessed remotely. Currently, quantum transmission protocols used
for Universal Blind Quantum Computation [21] can be used for transferring quantum data un-
known to the server. Such protocols provide also correctness of the data and authentication of
the transmission. However, they cannot be used for preventing the situation when maliciously
prepared data are provided and result in the undesired behavior of quantum machine. This
might lead, for example, resulting in denial of service effect. The analysis of the impact that
the malformed data can have on the quantum computing infrastructure is still missing and this
aspect of using quantum computers in the cloud deserves more attention.
Contribution In this paper study how the input data can influence the efficiency of quantum
algorithms based on quantum spatial search. We demonstrate that the efficiency of quantum
algorithms can be significantly diminished by manipulation of the input data. For the purpose of
this paper we consider the following scenario. We have two parties, Alice and Bob. Alice prepares
input data and sends them to Bob, who has for his disposal quantum computational resources.
Alice requests from Bob some kind of processing eg. sorting a list or finding its maximum. This
situation naturally occurs in cloud computing scenario. If the input data are altered by a third
party, Eve, then the computational process executed by Bob may require more resources then
initially assumed. In this situation Bob might not be able to handle queries from other users.
However, the client-server scenario we consider here can also include the possibility that Alice
is responsible for sending data which are already malformed. This might result either from the
purposeful acting of Alice or from the fact that the data contain instances of problems which
are hard for quantum computers to handle.
As an example one can consider a sorting via classical algorithm QuickSort. The algorithm
achieves average-case performance O(n log(n)), for number of elements n. However, for simple
fixed pivot choice, one can provide malicious input data, which increase computation time
up to O(n2). If no security is considered, choosing such data may considerably increase the
computational resources required for running the algorithm. If the computer processes such
data, this may result in denial-of-service. Fortunately, there are known solutions to this problem,
for example, choosing pivot randomly.
Similar problems arise in the quantum spatial search, based on different models of quantum
walks. For the continuous-time quantum walk, the algorithm works very well and securely
on many graphs [7, 8, 9], achieving efficiency O(
√
n), for the graph order n. However, there
are known examples, such as a two-dimensional grid, for which the algorithm reaches linear
complexity only [1]. While the grid graph can be searched much faster for the discrete coined
quantum walk, it is known that specific subgraphs of the searched graphs can form so-called
exceptional configurations [10] which strongly reduce the efficiency.
In this paper we consider the formation of exceptional configurations as a method of at-
tacking quantum spatial search. We propose a framework enabling the analysis of the attack
efficiency based on the expected runtime of the algorithm. We utilize this framework for selected
families of random graphs. We take into account different resources available for the attacker.
We also discuss the connection between our results and the security protocols used for Universal
Blind Quantum Computation.
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2 Preliminaries
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph and let S ⊂ V be a set of searched vertices. A quantum
spatial search algorithm is a quantum walk, which after t steps finds any marked v ∈ S with
probability p. While the classical spatial search is known to have time complexity Ω(n), it is
possible to achieve Θ(
√
n) for quantum algorithms [1, 11, 7, 9]. The complexity may depend on
a chosen graph [1] or a chosen set S [12]. Throughout this paper we assume that the complexity
of the quantum spatial search grows as Θ(nα) for some α > 0 which is commonly observed for
many types of graphs.
For discrete coined quantum walk (DCQW), the search problem with multiple marked ver-
tices can be a hard task for some combinations of marked vertices, known as exceptional con-
figurations [12, 10, 13]. The existence of an exceptional configuration is demonstrated in two
steps. First, the existence of a special stationary state needs to be shown. Second, a bound on
the probability needs to be determined, based on the stationary state. Recently, the class of
connected subgraphs having the stationary state has been described, which solves the first step.
Theorem ([14]). Let G be an arbitrary graph. Let H be its induced connected subgraph. H
contains a stationary state, if
• it is not bipartite, or
• it is (V 1H , V 2H)-bipartite satisfying∑
v∈V 1H
degG(v) =
∑
v∈V 2H
degG(v), (1)
where degG is the degree in graph G.
The exceptional configuration of order 2 (2EC) is a path of length 2, such that the degrees
of vertices in the original graph G are equal. The exceptional configuration of order 3 (3EC)
is a triangle graph, or a path of length 3, such that the degree of the middle vertex equals the
sum of the degrees of the end vertices in the original graph G. Wong has shown the equivalence
between coined and Szegedy model (SzQW) [15, 16], which is a general quantum walk definable
on an arbitrary directed graph. We are going to focus on the latter, as it is more suitable for
numerical analysis.
3 Description of the attack
Let us assume that Alice sends to Bob a description of the oracle, for example in the form of
the quantum circuit. Bob executes Szegedy quantum search based on the obtained oracle. As a
result Bob sends to Alice a marked vertex, found by the algorithm. In this situation Bob expects
to take advantage of the capabilities of quantum computer and obtain the result within time
Θ(tα).
Let us now assume that Eve has her own quantum resources and intercepts the description
of the oracle send by Alice. She executes the algorithm and finds the vertex in time Θ(tα). Then
she creates a description of new oracle, in which additional vertices is marked, and sends it to
Bob. If marked vertices form an exceptional configuration, then Bob will need Θ(tβ) time to
execute the algorithm, with β > α. One should note that modification of input data send by
Eve cannot be corrected by using the error correction code, as the modification are made on a
logical level.
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Bob may detect that the oracle was altered if the algorithm consumes more resources that
it was initially assumed. Additionally, we assume that Bob knows that the oracle has been
modified by marking the additional vertices. This is the worst possible scenario from Eve’s
perspective. In this situation he can modify the hyperparameters of his algorithm to limit the
adverse effect. The simplest strategy is to change the measurement time. By this he may reduce
the execution time to Θ(tβ), with β < β.
3.1 Framework for quantifying the efficiency of attacks
For the purpose of quantifying the efficiency of attacking methods, we introduce the formal
description of the family of quantum spatial search algorithms.
Definition. Quantum Spatial Search QSS is a tuple (Alg, t;G, S, θ), where Alg is a quantum
algorithm searching for any vertex v ∈ S in time t, running on graph G, and parametrized by
the set of parameters θ.
By p(QSS) we denote the success probability of QSS. Note that we do not define θ pre-
cisely, as it depends on the chosen algorithm Alg. For example, for coined quantum walk
Alg = DCQW, the parametrization consists of the set of coin operators. For Alg = SzQW, the
parametrization is the chosen stochastic operation P .
In order to compare different quantum spatial search algorithms we propose the following
measure of efficiency.
Definition. Expected runtime TQSS of quantum spatial search QSS = (Alg, t;G, S, θ) is de-
fined as
TQSS := t
p(QSS) . (2)
The expected runtime is an expectation of number of steps after which we get the result
using Bernoulli process. Such approach has been used in [1, 11], where the complexity was
analysed.
Using the formalised description of quantum spatial search algorithms, we can introduce the
concept of attack on an algorithm as follows.
Definition. Attack on QSS is a function h such that
h(Alg, t;G,S, θ) = (Alg, t;G′,S′, θ′). (3)
It should be stressed that the attack cannot change the evolution model and measure time
of QSS. Still we will consider the function altering only some of the elements of QSS. For
example, the attacks restricted to graph structure imply that S = S′ and θ = θ′.
If we allow QSS element to be changed, then we will say the element is hackable. Otherwise,
it is not hackable. Note that by definition Alg and t are not hackable.
To quantify the efficiency of the attacks we introduce attack efficiency as follows.
Definition. Attack efficiency effh,QSS on QSS is defined as
effh,QSS := 1− TQSSTh(QSS)
. (4)
We are interested in such functions h that effh,QSS ≥ 0. Furthermore, since t is common for
both QSS and h(QSS) we have
effh,QSS = 1− p(h(QSS))
p(QSS) . (5)
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Let us consider the following scenario. The user is trying to start an algorithm QSS, but the
attacker has changed it into QSS ′. If the user is aware of the attack and its nature, he can alter
the measurement time t in order to minimize the expected runtime. To describe this situation
we introduce strong attack efficiency.
Definition. Suppose we have QSS = (Alg, t;G, S, θ) and h : QSS 7→ (Alg, t;G′,S′, θ′). Strong
attack efficiency effh,QSS is defined as
effh,QSS := 1−
T(Alg,t;G,S,θ)
minτ≥0 T(Alg,τ ;G′,S′,θ′)
. (6)
This definition captures the best possible defence against the attack.
All of the above definitions were restricted to the fixed spatial search algorithm. Since our
aim is to analyse the efficiency of attacks on more general graph classes, we extend the previously
defined terms.
Definition. Let Q be a set of quantum spatial searches and h be an attack on Q. Then maximal
attack efficiency on Q, effh,Q, is defined as
effh,Q := maxQSS∈Q
effh,QSS . (7)
Similarly, maximal strong attack efficiency on Q, effh,Q, is defined as
effh,Q := maxQSS∈Q
effh,QSS . (8)
The above definition captures the pessimistic level of robustness against the attack. Similarly,
we can define the mean and minimal efficiencies. In practice, we would like to find the dependence
between the efficiency and the order of the graph.
Instead of providing deterministic Qn, we will focus on Qn defined by random graph models
Gn.
Definition. Let Gn be a random graph model, and let for arbitrary G exist a quantum spatial
search QSS(G) = (Alg, t(G);G, S(G), θ(G)). Let h be an attack defined on QSS. We say that
the efficiency of the attack is almost surely at least En iff
P(effh,QSS(G) ≥ En|G ∈ Gn) n→∞−−−→ 1. (9)
The above definition can be naturally applied to strong efficiency.
4 Attacks on quantum spatial search algorithms
We consider the formation of exceptional configurations as a method of attacking quantum
spatial search.
We will consider the attacks altering the set of marked vertices only. For quantum spatial
search (SzQW, t;G, {v}, Pu), we add marked vertices in such a way that the newly generated set
S′ ⊃ {v} forms a connected exceptional configuration. As the probability of finding any vertex
from EC is much lower than the probability of finding a single marked vertex [10], we decrease
the success probability of the algorithm.
Suppose that the algorithm outputs a vertex from S′ \ {v}. Since we choose additional
marked vertices from close neighbourhood of the original marked vertex v, the possible defence
against the attack is to make a simple classical search over its neighbourhood, which is efficient
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Figure 1: Probability of forming an exceptional configuration with a random vertex for different
models of random graphs. (a) probability of forming EC of order 2; (b) probability of forming
EC of order 2 or 3; (c) probability of forming EC of order 2 or 3 within distance 1 from initially
marked. For each graph order n = 100, 150, . . . , 4000 we have analyzed 100 graphs. The area
describes the range of attack probability obtained from sampled graphs. Blue solid lines describe
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi graphs, orange dashed lines describe Watts-Strogatz graphs, and green dotted lines
describe Baraba´si-Albert graphs.
for sparse graphs. However, the cumulated success probability of measuring any of S′ is small.
Hence, the attack is effective.
Let us analyse Erdo˝s-Re´nyi, Watts-Strogatz, and Baraba´si-Albert models. For Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
we choose the probability of adding edge p = 2 log(n)n , for Watts-Strogatz we select initial degree
K = d2 log ne and randomness β = 0.5 [17], and for Baraba´si-Albert we set attachment param-
eter to m0 = 3 [18, 19]. First, we analyse the probability that for randomly chosen vertex v we
can construct an exceptional configuration S such that v ∈ S. Next, we analyse the efficiency
of the attack.
Numerical results demonstrate that for every vertex of Watts-Strogatz graph we can almost
surely find an exceptional configuration of order 3 (3EC), see Fig. 1. Thus the model can be
attacked almost surely for any vertex. This is no longer the case when we allow constructing an
exceptional configuration of order 2 only. For Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and Baraba´si-Albert models, even
3EC will not provide this kind of advantage for the attacker. Nevertheless, the probability of
attacking is still large, and the attacker may be able to construct an exceptional configuration
of a higher order.
Another constraint for resources available to the attacker is the distance between the origi-
nally marked vertices and the newly marked ones. We consider two scenarios. For local excep-
tional configurations, the new vertices are direct neighbours of the original vertex. In the global
scenario, they are at most neighbours of neighbours. Based on Fig. 1, one can see that it is much
easier to find global exceptional configurations than the local ones for Baraba´si-Albert model.
Hence the probability of attacking increases if the attacked has the ability to use such EC. For
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model the attacker cannot utilize this type of advantage, for given parametrization.
Furthermore, for p = ω(log(n)/n) all vertices have almost equal degrees [20]. This makes finding
path graph 3EC impossible, as degree condition from Preliminaries section cannot be fulfilled.
We have not observed any dependence for Watts-Strogatz model.
For analysing the efficiency of the attack, we have chosen at random two vertices forming an
exceptional configuration. We have analyzed 50 graphs for each order n = 100, 150, . . . , 2400 for
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Figure 2: Attack efficiency and strong attack efficiency for random graph models. Pairs of vertices
were chosen at random from the collection of all 2EC. Left plots present the efficiency (the
case of unchanged measurement time). Right plots present the strong efficiency (the case with
measurement time chosen optimally). While Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and Watts-Strogatz present similar
results, one can observe more robust behaviour for Baraba´si-Albert model.
all models, using the optimization algorithm implemented in QuantumWalk package 1 with
penalty time tpen = dlog(n)e. Parameter tpen is a value which is added to the time, thus changing
the expected time into (t+ tpen)/p. Such adjustment prevents the optimization algorithm from
halting at small time. Since log(n) is typically much smaller than t, its impact on our results is
negligible.
In order to asses the impact of the attack on the complexity of quantum spatial search we
have calculated the expected runtime for three cases for each random graph. In the first case,
which represents the reference search, we have a single marked element. This case provides the
value of efficiency of the search TQSS for a given graph. Next, we execute the QSS on the
graph modified by the addition of a single marked element, which results in the formation of
an exceptional configuration. This case provides us the value of the increase of the expected
run-time resulting from the attack, and thus the efficiency of the attack (cf. Eq. (4)). Finally,
we calculate the expected run-time for the case when the user is aware of the attack and can
utilize this knowledge to minimize its effects. In this case we calculate the strong efficiency (cf.
Eq. 6).
Numerical results presented in Fig. 2 show that the attacking efficiency depends on the
chosen graph model. Left three plots show that if user is not aware of the attack, the efficiency
is almost surely 0.8 for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and almost surely 0.9 for Watts-Strogatz. For Baraba´si-
Albert the results are much more irregular, and no level of efficiency can be guaranteed. This
suggests there are some other parameters influencing the efficiency of the attack.
1Code available at https://github.com/QuantumWalks/QuantumWalk.jl
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Figure 3: Comparison of efficiency for the reference search (left plots) and the search after the
attack (right plots) for different models of random graphs. Right plots provide detailed analysis
of results concerning the efficiency case from Fig. 2. The tangent of regression line, denoted by
α, is the numerically derived complexity Θ(nα). One can observe the increase in the run-time
resulting from the attack for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and Watts-Strogatz models.
If the user is aware of the attack, it is possible to prevent it at least partially for all models
by changing the measurement time. The efficiency in this case is captured by the notion of
strong efficiency. For Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and Watts-Strogatz models the strong efficiency is almost
surely at least 0.5. For Baraba´si-Albert we still observe high irregularity in obtained data and
the strong efficiency is almost surely significantly smaller than 1.
As the complexity attack should result in the algorithm complexity growth, we have deter-
mined numerically the expected time change in the case of common measurement time. The
results are presented in Fig. 3. We have assumed that the complexity grows as the power com-
plexity, Θ(nα). The tangent of the regression line of the expected run-time in the function of the
graph order on the log-log scale provides the approximation of the parameter α. The observed
growth of the values of α, resulting from the attack, demonstrates that the attacker is able to
significantly increase the expected run-time of the quantum algorithm. This suggests that the
algorithm is vulnerable to the complexity attack, which might result in the denial-of-service of
the quantum computer.
5 Summary and discussion
In this paper we have signified the problem of possible vulnerability of quantum algorithms
to the complexity attacks. The presented approach is based on the analysis of input data. As
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such it can be used to discover weaknesses of quantum computers resulting from the application
of quantum algorithms on input data unsuitable for processing on quantum machines. This is
contrast to the common approach where only the theoretical computational complexity is taken
into account.
We have developed the theoretical framework for quantifying the efficiency of the attacks. We
have constructed an attack based on exceptional configurations and analysed it in the context of
its applicability and efficiency. The analysis confirms that it is possible to decrease the efficiency
of quantum spatial search based on Szegedy walk by malicious modification of input data.
One should note that the presented results can be applied for a general class of graphs. This
is in contrast to the results from [10], where only special classes of graphs were considered. For
those classes it can be shown analytically that the algorithm complexity changes from Θ(
√
n)
to Θ(n).
It should be stressed that the models of random graphs used for assessing the security
of quantum algorithms mimic the structure of real-world data [19]. As such the presented
analysis confirms that the theoretical security of quantum procedures can be inadequate when
the algorithms are applied for specific input data. This includes input data which encode the
connections observed in complex networks.
We should also stress that the scenario considered in this work does not focus on the security
of the communication which takes place between the client and the server. On the contrary, our
figure of merit is the impact of the modified data on the computational resource used by the
server. This is in contrast to the protocols based on the concept of Universal Blind Quantum
Computation [21]. Such protocols enable the detection of the input data modification, if the
data are encoded in a quantum state. Alice can use such protocols to counteract the effect of
data alteration by informing Bob about the Eve’s activity. However, such protocol cannot be
used to prevent Alice from sending malformed input data. On the other hand in our scenario
it is easy to include the possibility that Alice is responsible for sending data which are already
malformed – either on purpose or by accident – and our goal is to asses how often such situation
can occur when we consider data modeled by complex networks. Our results show that secure
transmission is insufficient for ensuring the availability of the quantum hardware.
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